We study two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time and infinite horizon. We prove that the value in randomized stopping times exists as soon as the payoff processes are right-continuous. In particular, as opposed to existing literature, we do not assume any conditions on the relations between the payoff processes. We also show that both players have simple ε-optimal randomized stopping times; namely, randomized stopping times which are small perturbations of non-randomized stopping times.
Introduction
Stopping games in discrete time were introduced by Dynkin (1969) as a variation of optimal stopping problems. In Dynkin's (1969) setup, two players observe the realization of two discrete time processes (x t , r t ) t∈N . Player 1 chooses a stopping time µ such that {µ = t} ⊆ {r t ≥ 0} for every t ∈ N, and player 2 chooses a stopping time ν such that {ν = t} ⊆ {r t < 0} for every t ∈ N. Thus, players are not allowed to stop simultaneously. Player 2 then pays player 1 the amount x min{µ,ν} 1 min{µ,ν}<+∞ , where 1 is the indicator function. This amount is a random variable. Denote the expected payoff player 1 receives by γ(µ, ν) = E[x min{µ,ν} 1 min{µ,ν}<+∞ ]. Dynkin (1969) proved that the game admits a value; that is, Since then many authors generalized this basic result, both in discrete time and in continuous time.
In discrete time, Neveu (1975) allows the players to stop simultaneously, that is, he introduces three uniformly integrable adapted processes (a t , b t , c t ) t∈N , the two players choose stopping times µ and ν respectively, and the payoff player 2 pays player 1 is a µ 1 {µ<ν} + b ν 1 {µ>ν} + c µ 1 {µ=ν<+∞} . Neveu (1975) provides sufficient conditions for the existence of the value.
One of the conditions he imposes is the following:
• Condition C: c t = a t ≤ b t for every t ≥ 0.
It is well known that in general the value need not exist when condition C is not satisfied. Rosenberg et al. (2001) allow the players to choose randomized stopping times, and they prove, in discrete time again, the existence of the value in randomized stopping times. This result was recently generalized by Shmaya & Solan (2002) to the existence of an ε-equilibrium in the non-zero-sum problem.
Several authors, including Bismut (1979) , Alario-Nazaret et al. (1982) and Lepeltier & Maingueneau (1984) In the present paper we prove that every stopping game in continuous time where (a t ) t≥0 and (b t ) t≥0 are right-continuous, and (c t ) t≥0 is progressively measurable, admits a value in randomized stopping times. In addition, we construct ε-optimal strategies which are as close as one wishes to a pure (non randomized) stopping time; roughly speaking, there is a stopping time µ such that for every δ sufficiently small there is an ε-optimal strategy that stops with probability 1 between times µ and µ + δ. Finally, we construct an ε-optimal strategy in the spirit of Dynkin (1969) and we extend the model by introducing cumulative payoffs and final payoffs.
Stopping games in continuous time were applied in various contexts. The one player stopping problem (the Snell envelope) is used in finance for the pricing of the American option, see, e.g., Bensoussan (1984) and Karatzas (1988) . More recently Cvitanic & Karatzas (1996) used stopping games for the study of backward stochastic differential equation with reflecting barriers, and Ma & Cvitanic (2001) for the pricing of "the American game option". Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) used stopping games to study strategic exit from a shrinking market.
Model, literature and main result
A two-player zero-sum stopping game in continuous time Γ is given by:
• A probability space (Ω, A, P ): (Ω, A) is a measurable space and P is a σ-additive probability measure on (Ω, A) .
• A filtration in continuous time F = (F t ) t≥0 satisfying "the usual conditions"; that is, F is right-continuous, and F 0 contains all P -null sets:
for every B ∈ A with P (B) = 0 and every A ⊂ B, one has A ∈ F 0 . Denote F ∞ := ∨ t≥0 F t . Assume without loss of generality that F ∞ = A. Hence (Ω, A, P ) is a complete probability space.
• Three uniformly bounded F-adapted processes (a t , b t , c t ) t≥0 . 1 A pure strategy of player 1 (resp. player 2) is a F-adapted stopping time µ (resp. ν). We allow players to never stop, by choosing µ (or ν) to be equal to +∞.
The game proceeds as follows. Player 1 chooses a pure strategy µ, and player 2 chooses simultaneously and independently a pure strategy ν. Player 2 then pays player 1 the amount a µ 1 {µ<ν} + b ν 1 {µ>ν} + c µ 1 {µ=ν<+∞} , which is a random variable. The expected payoff that correspond to a pair of pure
Hence, if the game never stops, the payoff is 0. This could be relaxed by adding to the payoff a final payoff χ1 µ=ν=+∞ , where χ is some A-measurable function; see Section 4. For a given stopping game Γ we denote the expected payoff by γ Γ (µ, ν) when we want to emphasize the dependency of the expected payoff on the game.
The quantity sup µ inf ν γ(µ, ν) is the maximal amount that player 1 can guarantee to receive; that is, the best he can get (in expectation) if player 1 As we argue below (see Section 2.1) our results hold for a larger class of payoff processes, that contains the class of uniformly integrable payoff processes. strategy. Similarly, by playing properly, player 2 can guarantee to pay no more than inf ν sup µ γ(µ, ν).
Definition 1
If sup µ inf ν γ(µ, ν) = inf ν sup µ γ(µ, ν) then the common value is the value in pure strategies of the game, and is denoted by v. Any strategy µ for which inf ν γ(µ, ν) is within ε of v is an ε-optimal strategy of player 1.
ε-optimal strategies of player 2 are defined analogously. are right-continuous, and (b) a t = c t ≤ b t for every t ≥ 0, the value exists and both players have pure ε-optimal strategies.
Remark 1:
Lepeltier & Maingueneau (1984) require that the processes (a t , b t ) t≥0 are optional; that is, measurable with respect to the optional filtration. Recall that the optional filtration is the one generated by all RCLL (right-continuous with left limit) processes. Under the "usual conditions" it is also the filtration generated by all right-continuous processes (see, e.g., Dellacherie & Meyer, 1975 , §IV-65).
Laraki (2000, Theorem 9.1) slightly extended this result by requiring that c t is in the convex hull of a t and b t (c t ∈ co{a t , b t }) for every t ≥ 0 instead of (b) of Theorem 2.
The pure ε-optimal strategies that exist by Theorem 2 need not be finite.
Indeed, the value of the game that is given by a t = c t = −1 and b t = 1 for every t ≥ 0 is 0, and the only 0-optimal pure strategy of player 1 is µ = +∞.
Moreover, if µ is an ε-optimal pure strategy of player 1 then P (µ < +∞) ≤ ε.
It is well known that in general the value in pure strategies need not exist. Indeed, take a t = b t = 1 and c t = 0 for every t. Since γ(µ, µ) = 0 it follows that sup µ inf ν γ(µ, ν) = 0. For every stopping time ν define a stopping time µ ν by
Since γ(µ ν , ν) = 1 for every ν it follows that inf ν sup µ γ(µ, ν) = 1, and the value in pure strategies does not exist. The difficulty with the last example is that player 2, knowing the strategy of player 1, can stop exactly at the same time as his opponent. The solution is to allow player 1 to choose his stopping time randomly, thereby making the probability that the players stop simultaneously vanish. Indeed, if player 1 could have randomly chosen his stopping time, say, uniformly in the interval [0, 1], then the game terminates before time 1 with probability 1, and the probability of simultaneous stopping is 0, whatever player 2 plays. In particular, such a strategy could guarantee player 1 payoff 1.
In the game theoretic literature, a standard and natural way to increase the set of strategies is by allowing players to randomize. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over pure strategies. In general, this allows to convexify the set of strategies, and makes the payoff function bilinear.
One can then apply a standard min-max Theorem (e.g., Sion, 1958) to prove the existence of the value in mixed strategies, provided some regularity conditions hold (e.g., the space of mixed strategies is compact and the payoff function continuous).
Three equivalent ways to randomize the set of pure strategies in our setup are discussed in Touzi & Vieille (2002) . We adopt the following definition of mixed strategies due to Aumann (1964) . It extends the probability space to Definition 3 A mixed strategy of player 1 is a measurable function φ :
is a stopping time.
The interpretation is the following: player 1 chooses randomly r ∈ [0, 1], and then stops the game at time µ r = φ(r, ·). Mixed strategies of player 2 are denoted by ψ, and, for every s ∈ [0, 1], the s-section is denoted by
The expected payoff that corresponds to a pair of mixed strategies (φ, ψ)
is:
Though the payoff function given by (1) is bilinear, without strong assumptions on the data of the game the payoff function is not continuous for the same topology which makes the strategy space compact.
is the value in mixed strategies, and it is denoted by V . Every strategy φ such that inf ψ γ(φ, ψ) is within ε of V is ε-optimal for player 1. ε-optimal strategies of player 2 are defined analogously.
Observe that sup φ inf ψ γ(φ, ψ) = sup φ inf ν γ(φ, ν), and that inf ψ sup φ γ(φ, ψ) = inf ψ sup µ γ(µ, ψ). Hence, to prove the existence of the value, it suffices to show that sup φ inf ν γ(φ, ν) = inf ψ sup µ γ(µ, ψ). Moreover, one always has
Existence of the value in mixed strategies in stopping games with continuous time was studied by Touzi & Vieille (2002) , who proved the following.
Let Φ T be the space of all mixed strategies φ such that λ⊗P (µ r ≤ T ) = 1, and let Ψ T be the space of all mixed strategies ψ such that λ⊗P (ν s ≤ T ) = 1. One class of mixed strategies will play a special role along the paper. Recall that a process (x t ) t≥0 is progressively measurable if for every Recall also that an optional process is progressively measurable (see, e.g., Dellacherie & Meyer, 1975 , §IV-64).
The main result we present is the following.
Theorem 7
If the processes (a t ) t≥0 and (b t ) t≥0 are right-continuous and if (c t ) t≥0 is progressively measurable then the value in mixed strategies exists.
Moreover, for every ε > 0 there is δ 0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for every δ ∈ (0, δ 0 )
both players have δ-almost pure ε-optimal strategies.
Our proof heavily relies on the result of Lepeltier & Maingueneau (1984), where they extend the discrete time variational approach of Neveu (1975) to continuous time.
On the payoff processes
A F-adapted process x = (x t ) t≥0 is in the class D (see, e. For a measurable process (x t ) t≥0 and r ≥ 0 define the process (x r t ) t≥0 by:
By Dellacherie
The process (x r t ) t≥0 is uniformly bounded by r, and, in addition, if (x t ) t≥0 is right-continuous or F-adapted so is (x r t ) t≥0 . If the payoff processes (a t ) t≥0 , (b t ) t≥0 and (c t ) t≥0 are not necessarily bounded but are in the class D then for every ε > 0 there exists r > 0 such that
Hence, if the game Γ = (Ω, A, P ; F, (a t , b t , c t ) t≥0 ) satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 7, it admits a value. Moreover, every ε-optimal strategy in Γ r := (Ω, A, P ; F, (a r t , b r t , c r t ) t≥0 ) is 2ε-optimal in Γ. In particular, all the existence results that are proved for uniformly 
Proof
In the present section the main result of the paper is proven. From now on we fix a stopping game Γ such that (a t , b t ) t≥0 are right-continuous and (c t ) t≥0 is progressively measurable.
Preliminaries
The following Lemma will be used in the sequel.
Lemma 8 For every F-adapted stopping time τ and every ε > 0 there is
A similar statement holds when one replaces the process (a t ) t≥0 by the process (b t ) t≥0 .
Proof. Since (a t ) t≥0 is right-continuous, it is progressively measurable (see, e.g., Dellacherie & Meyer, 1975, §IV-15) .
The progressive measurability of (a t ) t≥0 implies that δ τ (ω) (ω) is measurable with respect to The right-continuity of (a t ) t≥0 implies that P ({ω : δ τ (ω) (ω) > 0}) = 1.
Since P is σ-additive and {ω : δ τ (ω) (ω) > 0} = ∪ n>0 {ω : δ τ (ω) (ω) > 1 n }, the lemma follows by choosing δ > 0 sufficiently small so that P ({ω :
By Lemma 8 and since the payoff processes are uniformly bounded, one obtains the following.
Corollary 9 Let a stopping time τ and ε > 0 be given. There exists δ > 0 sufficiently small such that for every set A ∈ F τ and every stopping time µ that satisfies τ ≤ µ ≤ τ + δ,
3.2 The case a t ≤ b t for every t ≥ 0 
Observe that a δ-pure mixed strategy is in particular δ-almost pure.
When µ is a stopping time, we sometime denote the δ-pure mixed strategy defined in (2) simply by µ + rδ.
In this section we prove the following result: when a t ≤ b t for every t ≥ 0 the value in mixed strategies exists, it is independent of (c t ) t≥0 , and both players have δ-pure -optimal strategies, provided δ is sufficiently small.
The idea is the following. Assume player 1 decides to stop at time t.
If c t ≤ a t , player 1 wants to mask the exact time in which he stops, so that both players do not stop at the same time. Since payoffs are rightcontinuous, he can stop randomly in a small interval after time t. Similarly, if c t > a t , player 2 prefers that player 1 stops alone at time t rather than to stop simultaneously with player 1 at time t.
Proposition 11 If a t ≤ b t for every t ≥ 0 then the value in mixed strategies exists. Moreover, the value is independent of the process (c t ) t≥0 , and for every ε > 0 there is δ 0 > 0 such that for every δ ∈ (0, δ 0 ) both players have δ-pure ε-optimal strategies. If a t ≤ c t ≤ b t for every t ≥ 0 then the value in pure strategies exists, and there are -optimal strategies which are independent of (c t ) t≥0 .
Proof. Consider an auxiliary stopping game Γ * = (Ω, A, P ; F, (a * t , b * t , c * t ) t≥0 ), where a * t = a t and b * t = c * t = b t for every t ≥ 0. By Theorem 2 the game Γ * has a value in pure strategies v * . We will prove that v * is the value in mixed strategies of the original game. Since v * is independent of the process (c t ) t≥0 , the second claim in the proposition will follow.
Fix ε > 0. Let µ be an ε-optimal strategy of player 1 in Γ * . In particular,
We now construct a mixed strategy φ that satisfies inf ν γ Γ (φ, ν) ≥ v * −5ε.
By Lemma 8 there is
Define a δ-pure mixed strategy φ by
Let ν be any stopping time. Since µ is ε-optimal in Γ * , by the definition of Γ * , and since λ ⊗ P (µ + rδ = ν) = 0,
Since λ ⊗ P (µ + rδ = ν) = 0 and (c t ) t≥0 is progressively measurable,
By Corollary 9, and since a t ≤ b t for every t ≥ 0,
Corollary 9 implies in addition that
By (3)- (6),
Consider an auxiliary stopping game Γ * * = (Ω, A, P ; F, (a * * t , b * * t , c * * t ) t≥0 ), where a * * t = c * * t = a t and b * * t = b t for every t ≥ 0. A symmetric argument to the one provided above proves that the game Γ * * has a value v * * , and that player 2 has a mixed strategy ψ which satisfies
Since ε is arbitrary, v * = v * * , so that v * is the value in mixed strategies of Γ, and φ and ψ are 5ε-optimal mixed strategies of the two players.
every pair of pure strategies (µ, ν). Hence
: the value in pure strategies exists. Moreover, any -optimal strategy of player 1 (resp. player 2) in Γ * (resp. Γ * * ) is also -optimal in Γ. In particular, if a t ≤ c t ≤ b t for every t ≥ 0, both players have -optimal strategies which are independent of (c t ) t≥0 .
Proof of Theorem 7
Define τ by
where the infimum of an empty set is +∞. Since (a t − b t ) t≥0 is progressively measurable with respect to (F t ) t≥0 , τ is an F-adapted stopping time (see, e.g., Dellacherie & Meyer, 1975 , §IV-50).
The idea is the following. We show that it is optimal for both players to stop at or around time τ (provided the game does not stop before time τ ).
Hence the problem reduces to the game between times 0 and τ . Since for
The following notation will be useful in the sequel. For a pair of pure strategies (µ, ν) and a set A ∈ A, we define
This is the expected payoff restricted to A. For a pair of mixed strategies (φ, ψ) we define
where µ r and ν s are the sections of φ and ψ respectively.
Set
A 0 = {τ = +∞},
Define a F τ -measurable function w by
Define a stopping game Γ * = (Ω, A, P, (F t ) t≥0 , (a * t , b * t , c * t ) t≥0 ) by:
That is, the payoff is set to w at and after time τ .
The game Γ * satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 11, hence it has a value in mixed strategies V . Moreover, for every ε > 0 both players have δ-pure ε-optimal strategies, provided δ > 0 is sufficiently small.
We now prove that V is the value of the game Γ as well. Fix ε > 0. We only show that player 1 has a mixed strategy φ such that inf ν γ Γ (φ, ν) ≥ V − 7ε. An analogous argument shows that player 2 has a mixed strategy ψ such that sup µ γ Γ (µ, ψ) ≤ V + 7ε. Since ε is arbitrary, V is indeed the value in mixed strategies of Γ.
Assume δ is sufficiently small so that the following conditions hold (by the proofs of Lemma 8 and Proposition 11 such δ exists).
C.1 Player 1 has a δ-pure ε-optimal strategy φ * = µ + rδ in Γ * .
C.2 P ({µ + δ < τ }) ≥ P ({µ < τ }) − ε/M , where M ∈]0, +∞[ is a uniform bound of the payoff processes.
We now claim that one can choose µ so that µ ≤ τ . Indeed, assume that
Define a stopping time µ = min{µ, τ }. We will prove that the δ-pure strategy φ = µ + rδ is also ε-optimal in Γ * , which establishes the claim. Given a stopping time ν define a stopping time ν as follows: ν = τ over {µ > τ }, and ν = ν otherwise.
However,
, and since µ = µ and ν = ν over {µ ≤ τ },
Since ν is arbitrary, µ + rδ is ε-optimal, as desired.
Define a mixed strategy φ as follows.
Observe that φ is δ-almost pure.
The mixed strategies φ and φ * differ only over the set {µ = τ } ∩ (A 1 ∪ A 2 ). Since over this set the payoff in Γ * is w provided the game terminates after time τ , whatever the players play, φ is an ε-optimal mixed strategy in Γ * .
Let ν be an arbitrary pure strategy of player 2. Define a partition
B 1 = {µ < τ < µ + δ} ∩ {ν ≥ τ }, and
Over B 0 the game terminates before time τ under (φ, ν). In particular,
By (C.2) λ ⊗ P (B 1 ) < ε/M , so that
Over B 2 ∩ A 0 the game never terminates under (φ, ν), so that
Over
Finally, since λ ⊗ P ({µ + rδ = ν}) = 0, by Corollary 9, since (c t ) t≥0 is progressively measurable, and since a τ ≥ b τ = w over A 3 ,
Summing Eqs. (7)- (11), and using the ε-optimality of φ * in Γ * , gives us
as desired.
Extensions
In the present section we construct specific ε-optimal strategies in the spirit Proposition 12 If c t ∈ co{a t , b t } for every t ∈ [0, τ ] then the value exists in pure strategies. An ε-optimal strategy for Player 1 is inf {t ≥ 0 : V * t ≤ a * t + ε}, and an ε-optimal strategy for Player 2 is inf {t : V * t ≥ b * t − ε} .
Corollary 13
Every stopping game such that (a t , b t , c t ) t≥0 are continuous and satisfies c 0 ∈ co{a 0 , b 0 } admits a value in pure strategies.
On final payoff
Our convention is that the payoff is 0 if no player ever stops. In fact, one can add a final payoff as follows. Let χ be an A-measurable and integrable function. The expected payoff that corresponds to a pair of pure strategies (µ, ν) is:
The expected payoff can be written as:
where E 
On cumulative payoff
In our definition, players receive no payoff before the game stops. One can add a cumulative payoff as follows. Let (x t ) t≥0 be a progressively measurable process satisfying E P +∞ 0 |x t | dt < +∞, and suppose that the expected payoff that corresponds to a pair of pure strategies (µ, ν) is given by Thus, the game is equivalent to the stopping game Γ * = (Ω, A, P, (F t ) t≥0 , (a *
